The concentration documented in previous sections has a stark geographic dimension. Pakistan, like most of the Global South, has zero presence across the entire AI supply chain: no domestic GPU design, no chip fabrication, no EUV lithography, no hyperscale cloud infrastructure. Complete dependence on foreign providers raises fundamental questions about digital sovereignty.
State Investment in Semiconductor Sovereignty
πΊπΈ
$52B
United States
CHIPS Act (2022)
+ 10% Intel stake
πͺπΊ
EUR 200B
European Union
InvestAI
Mobilized capital
π―π΅
$65B
Japan
By 2030
$27B spent 2000-2024
π°π·
$23B
South Korea
Chip support
Tax + subsidies
Historical precedent: US DoD and NASA were the first major customers for integrated circuits (1950sβ60s). Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan used targeted industrial policy in the 1970sβ80s to build semiconductor industries.
The geographic pattern is not accidental. Energy and water β the inputs documented in Section 09 β are precisely the resources scarce in much of the Global South. AI capacity concentrates where energy is cheap and abundant, reinforcing existing patterns of global inequality.
0%
Global South share of stack
100%
Dependence on foreign compute
$0
Sovereign chip investment (Pakistan)
If TSMC were disrupted β whether through natural disaster, geopolitical conflict in the Taiwan Strait, or export restrictions β countries with no alternative supply would face total compute cutoff. The concentration that creates efficiency also creates fragility, with asymmetric exposure between those who control the supply chain and those who depend on it.
The Hagiu-Wright Commoditization Argument
A firm dominant in layer A has incentives to commoditize layer B (cheap inputs). A firm dominant in layer B has incentives to commoditize layer A (many customers). If ~7 firms each dominate different layers, they collectively push for competition in every other layer.
EXAMPLE: GOOGLE TPUs
Google designs custom TPUs to reduce dependence on Nvidia β commoditizes GPU layer but strengthens Google's vertical stack.
OPEN QUESTION
Is cross-layer commoditization pro-competitive (more competition) or anti-competitive (vertical foreclosure)?
Competition authorities are responding, though jurisdiction poses challenges. The US FTC's January 2025 review flagged three concerns: partnerships that affect compute and talent access, structures that increase switching costs, and arrangements giving cloud providers access to sensitive competitor information. No single authority can address a supply chain spanning four continents.
For Ex-Ante Regulation
Markets move faster than enforcement
Abuse cases take years to resolve. Existing digital market regimes (EU DMA, UK, Korea, Japan) are designed for platforms, not physical infrastructure. Proposed: FRAND access obligations, interoperability mandates, supply allocation rules.
Against Premature Regulation
Innovation requires returns
Defining "fair and reasonable" is difficult when firms invest billions in R&D with uncertain returns. Early standardization risks embedding dominant systems as the default. Regulation may freeze architecture before alternatives emerge.
AI capacity concentrates where energy is cheap and abundant β creating a new geography of exclusion that maps onto existing global inequalities.
Policy Responses (2024β2025)
US FTC
AI infrastructure review flagging partnership structures, switching costs, and information access
Jan 2025
EU/UK/US Joint
Statement on AI principles: fair dealing, interoperability, choice
2024
G7 Digital Competition
Communique on fair access to key inputs including AI chips
2024
OECD
Competition in AI Infrastructure report identifying concentration risks
2025
Key Relationships
Digital Sovereignty Gap
Countries without domestic capacity depend entirely on foreign firms for critical digital infrastructure β with no leverage when supply is constrained.
The FRAND Debate
Should bottleneck suppliers be required to offer access on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory terms? Standards bodies use FRAND for patents; could it apply to compute?
Inherently International
No single competition authority has jurisdiction over a supply chain spanning US, Netherlands, Taiwan, South Korea, and China. Coordination is essential but difficult.